


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22 November 1963

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# WEEKLY REVIEW

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of 1200 EST, 21 November 1963)

THE COMMUNIST WORLD

THE BARGHOORN CASE

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Moscow's handling of this affair suggests an initial miscalculation of the repercussions in the US, followed by efforts to minimize the damage to Soviet-American relations.

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

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


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
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


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## THE BARGHOORN CASE

The release of Professor Barghoorn on 16 November, two days after President Kennedy's public condemnation of Soviet behavior, apparently reflected a decision by the Soviet leaders to disengage as quickly as possible from this episode and to try to minimize the damage to Soviet-US relations.

Ambassador Kohler believes the Soviet authorities failed to anticipate the US reaction to Barghoorn's arrest and that they were bewildered and genuinely alarmed by the volume and intensity of US protests and actions. Moscow's terse announcement of Barghoorn's release stated that in view of the "concern of high US officials," the Soviet Government had decided "merely to expel him from the Soviet Union" rather than bring him to trial on espionage charges. Gromyko informed Kohler privately that this decision was the result of Khrushchev's personal intervention and requested that this be brought to the attention of President Kennedy.

Soviet propaganda has played down the incident, deplored the "hue and cry" raised in the US, and expressed the pious hope that Washington "will correctly evaluate the good will of the Soviet Government" in releasing Barghoorn.

In Ambassador Kohler's view, this episode does not reflect a deliberate decision to worsen relations with the US or to jettison the peaceful co-existence policy and move closer to Chinese Communist positions. Although the ambassador acknowledges that Soviet authorities regard an occasional espionage case as a useful device for warning the Soviet people against unmonitored contacts with Westerners, he feels the primary motive in the Barghoorn affair was the desire to secure a hostage for I. A. Ivanov, an employee of the Soviet "Amtorg" trade organization in New York who was arrested on 29 October. Gromyko told Kohler on 16 November that the USSR expects that the US Government "will take the necessary measures" to release Ivanov.

Moscow's apparent desire to avoid further damaging public exchanges over this case was evident in Gromyko's "confidential" warning to Kohler that if any US official publicly attempts to justify Barghoorn's behavior, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of Soviet actions, the USSR "will reserve the right to publish materials of the investigation, including the deposition of F. Barghoorn himself."

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